Buying votes and international organizations
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Göttingen
Courant Research Centre
2011
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| Series: | Discussion papers / Courant Research Centre
78 |
| In: |
Discussion papers (78)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, Volltext: http://www2.vwl.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/courant-papers/CRC-PEG_DP_78.pdf Download aus dem Internet, Stand: 23.01.2014, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90459 
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| Author Notes: | Axel Dreher and James Raymond Vreeland |
| Summary: | This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| Format: | Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat Reader. |