Buchumschlag

Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

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When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Gersbach, Hans (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: München CESifo 2001
Schriftenreihe:CESifo Working Paper 406
In: CESifo working papers (406)

Schlagworte:
Arbeitspapier
Graue Literatur
Spieltheorie
Politische Entscheidung
Wahlverhalten
Asymmetrische Information
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Online-Zugang:Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75843
Verlag, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=14561081
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Hans Gersbach
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians’ time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause.Keywords: Incentive contracts, politicians, long-term policies, elections and contracts, golden parachute clause.
Beschreibung:Online Resource
Dokumenttyp:Systemvoraussetzungen: PDF Reader.

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