Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Gersbach, Hans (Author)
Format:	Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	München CESifo 2001
Series:	CESifo Working Paper 406
In:	CESifo working papers (406)
Subjects:	Arbeitspapier Graue Literatur Spieltheorie Politische Entscheidung Wahlverhalten Asymmetrische Information Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Online Access:	Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75843 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=14561081
Author Notes:	Hans Gersbach