Reelection threshold contracts in politics

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reel...

Full description

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Gersbach, Hans (Author) , Liessem, Verena (Author)
Format:	Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	München CESifo 2001
Series:	CESifo Working Paper 622
In:	CESifo working papers (622)
Subjects:	Arbeitspapier Graue Literatur Anreiz Kontrakttheorie Spieltheorie Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie Demokratie Wahl
Online Access:	Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76064 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=14560653
Author Notes:	Hans Gersbach; Verena Liessem