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Democratic mechanisms: double majority rules and flexible agenda costs

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We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends on t...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Gersbach, Hans (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: München CESifo 2002
Schriftenreihe:CESifo Working Paper Category 2: Public Choice 749
In: CESifo working papers (749)

Schlagworte:
Arbeitspapier
Graue Literatur
Spieltheorie
Demokratie
Verfassung
Online-Zugang:Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76097
Verlag, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=14560372
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Hans Gersbach

MARC

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520 |a We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal and taxed and non-taxed individuals need to support the proposal; second, flexible agenda costs where the agenda-setter has to pay a certain amount of money if his proposal does not generate enough supporting votes; third, a ban on subsidies. We also illustrate that higher dimensional uncertainty about project parameters can make it easier to achieve first-best allocations and that universal equal treatment with regard to taxation is undesirable. 
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