Democratic mechanisms: double majority rules and flexible agenda costs

We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends on t...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Gersbach, Hans (Author)
Format:	Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	München CESifo 2002
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Category 2: Public Choice 749
In:	CESifo working papers (749)
Subjects:	Arbeitspapier Graue Literatur Spieltheorie Demokratie Verfassung
Online Access:	Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76097 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=14560372
Author Notes:	Hans Gersbach