Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils

This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central banke...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Gersbach, Hans (Author) , Hahn, Volker (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Frankfurt am Main Deutsche Bundesbank January 2001
Series:Discussion paper / Economic Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank 01/03
In: Discussion paper (01/03)

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Online Access:Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19541
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Author Notes:Hans Gersbach (University of Heidelberg), Volker Hahn (University of Heidelberg)
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Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils by Gersbach, Hans (Author) , Hahn, Volker (Author) ,


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Book/Monograph Working Paper