Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils
This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central banke...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Frankfurt am Main
Deutsche Bundesbank
January 2001
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| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper / Economic Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank
01/03 |
| In: |
Discussion paper (01/03)
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19541
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| Verfasserangaben: | Hans Gersbach (University of Heidelberg), Volker Hahn (University of Heidelberg) |
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