Exclusion in the all-pay auction: an experimental investigation

Contest designers or managers who want to maximize the overall revenue of a contest (relative performance scheme) are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to e...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Fehr, Dietmar (Author) , Schmid, Julia (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Germany Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH [2017]
Edition:Revised version of the WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2014-206
Series:Discussion paper / (WZB) Berlin Social Science Center, Research Area: Markets and Choice, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2017, 202 (April 2017)
In: Discussion paper (SP II 2017, 202 (April 2017))

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Online Access:Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157372
Verlag, Volltext: https://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2017/ii17-202.pdf
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Author Notes:Dietmar Fehr, Julia Schmid
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Exclusion in the all-pay auction: an experimental investigation by Fehr, Dietmar (Author) , Schmid, Julia (Author) ,


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Book/Monograph Working Paper