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Reelection threshold contracts in politics

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When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reel...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Gersbach, Hans (Author) , Liessem, Verena (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Munich Center for Economic Studies, Ifo-Inst. 2001
Series:Working paper series / CESifo 622
In: CESifo working papers (622)

Subjects:
Arbeitspapier
Graue Literatur
Anreiz
Kontrakttheorie
Spieltheorie
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Demokratie
Wahl
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Author Notes:Hans Gersbach; Verena Liessem
Description
Summary:When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reelection. Read my lips would turn into read my contracts. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.
Item Description:Literaturverz. S. 25 - 26
Internetausg.: ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/622.pdf

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