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Reelection threshold contracts in politics

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When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reel...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Gersbach, Hans (Author) , Liessem, Verena (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Munich Center for Economic Studies, Ifo-Inst. 2001
Series:Working paper series / CESifo 622
In: CESifo working papers (622)

Subjects:
Arbeitspapier
Graue Literatur
Anreiz
Kontrakttheorie
Spieltheorie
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Demokratie
Wahl
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Author Notes:Hans Gersbach; Verena Liessem
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Reelection threshold contracts in politics by Gersbach, Hans (Author) , Liessem, Verena (Author) ,


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