Climate policy commitment devices [dataset]

We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Dengler, Sebastian (Author) , Gerlagh, Reyer (Author) , Trautmann, Stefan T. (Author) , Kuilen, Gijs van de (Author)
Format: Database Research Data
Language:English
Published: Heidelberg Universität 2019-01-15
DOI:10.11588/data/R8HGIB
Subjects:
Online Access:Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.11588/data/R8HGIB
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.11588/data/R8HGIB
Get full text
Author Notes:Sebastian Dengler, Reyer Gerlagh, Stefan T. Trautmann, Gijs van de Kuilen
Description
Summary:We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.
Item Description:Deposit date: 2019-01-14
Gesehen am 30.01.2019
Physical Description:Online Resource
DOI:10.11588/data/R8HGIB