The creation of social norms under weak institutions
Preventing overfishing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-field experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects the creation of social norms in a three-player pr...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Heidelberg
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
14 May 2020
|
| Series: | Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
no. 684 |
| In: |
Discussion paper series (no. 684)
|
| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00028309 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, kostenfrei: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/28309/7/Diekert_2020_dp684.pdf Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00028309 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/235007 Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-283096 
|
| Author Notes: | Florian Diekert, Tillmann Eymess, Joseph Luomba, and Israel Waichman |
| Summary: | Preventing overfishing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-field experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects the creation of social norms in a three-player prisoner's dilemma game with/without a feedback mechanism. The provision of social information succeeds in creating norms of cooperation only if a feedback mechanism is available. Without feedback, social information cannot prevent the decline of cooperation rates. Exploring the role of the reference network, we find that the effect increases with social proximity among participants. |
|---|---|
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00028309 |