When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2014
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| In: |
International journal of game theory
Year: 2013, Volume: 43, Issue: 1, Pages: 25-36 |
| ISSN: | 1432-1270 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1
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| Author Notes: | Peter Duersch · Jörg Oechssler · Burkhard C. Schipper |
| Summary: | We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better. Every decision rule in this class is essentially unbeatable in exact potential games. Our results apply to many interesting games including all symmetric 2$$\times |
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| Item Description: | Published online: 7 March 2013 Gesehen am 09.10.2020 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1432-1270 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1 |