When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Article (Journal) |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2014
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| In: |
International journal of game theory
Year: 2013, Jahrgang: 43, Heft: 1, Pages: 25-36 |
| ISSN: | 1432-1270 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1 |
| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1
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| Verfasserangaben: | Peter Duersch · Jörg Oechssler · Burkhard C. Schipper |
MARC
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| 520 | |a We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better. Every decision rule in this class is essentially unbeatable in exact potential games. Our results apply to many interesting games including all symmetric 2$$\times |2 games, and standard examples of Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Imitation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Tit-for-tat | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Decision rules | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Learning | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Exact potential games | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Symmetric games | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Repeated games | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Relative payoffs | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Zero-sum games | |
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