Good decision vs. good results: outcome bias in the evaluation of financial agents

We document outcome bias in situations where an agent makes risky financial decisions for a principal. In three experiments, we show that the principal’s evaluations and financial rewards for the agent are strongly affected by the random outcome of the risky investment. This happens despite her exac...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: König-Kersting, Christian (Author) , Pollmann, Monique (Author) , Potters, Jan (Author) , Trautmann, Stefan T. (Author)
Format: Article (Journal)
Language:English
Published: 2021
In: Theory and decision
Year: 2021, Volume: 90, Issue: 1, Pages: 31-61
ISSN:1573-7187
DOI:10.1007/s11238-020-09773-1
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Online Access:Verlag, kostenfrei: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11238-020-09773-1.pdf
Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09773-1
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Author Notes:Christian König-Kersting, Monique Pollmann, Jan Potters, Stefan T. Trautmann
Description
Summary:We document outcome bias in situations where an agent makes risky financial decisions for a principal. In three experiments, we show that the principal’s evaluations and financial rewards for the agent are strongly affected by the random outcome of the risky investment. This happens despite her exact knowledge of the investment strategy, which can, therefore, be assessed independently of the outcome. The principal thus judges the same decision by the agent differently, depending on factors that the agent has no influence on. The effect of outcomes persists in a setting where principals communicate a preferred investment level. Principals are more satisfied with the agent after a random success when the agent did not follow the requested investment level, than after a failed investment that followed their explicit request.
Item Description:Published: 17 September 2020
Gesehen am 11.11.2020
Physical Description:Online Resource
ISSN:1573-7187
DOI:10.1007/s11238-020-09773-1