Subsidizing quantity donations: matches, rebates, and discounts compared

We present online-experimental evidence that challenges the generalizability of established results on subsidizing giving by considering a "quantity donation" scheme. We define this scheme as one in which donors choose how many units of a charitable good to fund, rather than the amount of...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Diederich, Johannes (Author) , Eckel, Catherine C. (Author) , Epperson, Raphael (Author) , Goeschl, Timo (Author) , Grossman, Philip Johnson (Author)
Format: Conference Paper Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Published: [Leipzig] Verein für Socialpolitik 2019
Edition:This version: November 22, 2018
Series:Jahrestagung 2019 / Verein für Socialpolitik C14, Session: Public Economics III no. C14-V1 V1
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Online Access:Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/203650
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Author Notes:Johannes Diederich, Catherine C. Eckel, Raphael Epperson, Timo Goeschl, Philip J. Grossman
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Summary:We present online-experimental evidence that challenges the generalizability of established results on subsidizing giving by considering a "quantity donation" scheme. We define this scheme as one in which donors choose how many units of a charitable good to fund, rather than the amount of money to give. We find that different subsidy types are equally effective in raising funds. This contrasts with the common result of matches being superior to rebates. The finding masks a higher likelihood of giving under rebates and larger donations under matches and discounts. Our results emphasize the role of small changes in the donation environment.
Physical Description:Online Resource