Testing dynamic consistency and consequentialism under ambiguity
Accounting for ambiguity aversion in dynamic decisions generally implies that either dynamic consistency or consequentialism must be given up. To gain insight into which of these principles better describes people's preferences we tested them using a variation of Ellsberg's three-color urn...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Nottingham
CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics
November 2020
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| Series: | CeDEx discussion paper series
no. 2020, 17 |
| In: |
CEDEX discussion paper series (no. 2020, 17)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, kostenfrei: https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/cedex-discussion-paper-2020-17.pdf Verlag, kostenfrei: https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/news/papers/2020-17.aspx Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/248289 
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| Author Notes: | Han Bleichrodt, Jurgen Eichberger, Simon Grant, David Kelsey and Chen Li |
| Summary: | Accounting for ambiguity aversion in dynamic decisions generally implies that either dynamic consistency or consequentialism must be given up. To gain insight into which of these principles better describes people's preferences we tested them using a variation of Ellsberg's three-color urn experiment. Subjects were asked to make a choice both before and after they received a signal. We found that most ambiguity neutral subjects satisfied both dynamic consistency and consequentialism and behaved consistent with subjective expected utility with Bayesian updating. The majority of ambiguity averse subjects violated at least one of the principles and they were more likely to satisfy consequentialism than dynamic consistency. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |