Changing collective action: norm-nudges and team decisions

We test whether a descriptive norm-nudge is a suitable policy tool to increase cooperation in a social dilemma when decisions are taken by teams, not individuals. 10 Each team in our experiment comes from a different fishing boat at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The provision of a norm-nudge is randomize...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Diekert, Florian (Author) , Eymess, Tillmann (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Heidelberg Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg December 2021
Series:AWI discussion paper series no. 709 (December 2021)
In: AWI discussion paper series (no. 709 (December 2021))

DOI:10.11588/heidok.00031120
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Online Access:Resolving-System: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00031120
Resolving-System: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-311204
Langzeitarchivierung Nationalbibliothek: https://d-nb.info/1249482178/34
Verlag, kostenfrei: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/31120
Verlag, kostenfrei: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/31120/7/Diekert_Eymess_2021_dp709.pdf
Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/261074
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Author Notes:Florian Diekert, Tillmann Eymess
Description
Summary:We test whether a descriptive norm-nudge is a suitable policy tool to increase cooperation in a social dilemma when decisions are taken by teams, not individuals. 10 Each team in our experiment comes from a different fishing boat at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The provision of a norm-nudge is randomized across two decision making mechanisms, enabling us to identify experience with egalitarian or hierarchical decision structures, both present at Lake Victoria. The descriptive norm-nudge increases cooperation by 14 and 16 percentage points for egalitarian and hierarchical 15 team decisions, respectively. Captains from boats with hierarchical organization are particularly responsive.
Physical Description:Online Resource
DOI:10.11588/heidok.00031120