Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?
Goeree and Holt (Am Econ Rev 91:1402-1422, 2001) experimentally study a number of games. In each case, they initially find strong support for Nash equilibrium; however, by changing an apparently irrelevant parameter, they find results which contradict Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we study the fi...
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Article (Journal) |
| Lingua: | inglese |
| Pubblicazione: |
05 June 2011
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| In: |
Economic theory
Year: 2011, Volume: 48, Fascicolo: 2, Pages: 313-339 |
| ISSN: | 1432-0479 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-011-0636-4 |
| Accesso online: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0636-4
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| Note sull'autore: | Jürgen Eichberger, David Kelsey |
| Riassunto: | Goeree and Holt (Am Econ Rev 91:1402-1422, 2001) experimentally study a number of games. In each case, they initially find strong support for Nash equilibrium; however, by changing an apparently irrelevant parameter, they find results which contradict Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we study the five normal form games from Goeree and Holt (Am Econ Rev 91:1402-1422, 2001). We argue that their results may be explained by the hypothesis that subjects view their opponents’ behaviour as ambiguous. Ambiguity-aversion causes players to avoid strategies, which give low out of equilibrium payoffs. Similarly, ambiguity preference can make strategies with high payoffs more attractive. |
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| Descrizione del documento: | Gesehen am 11.04.2022 |
| Descrizione fisica: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1432-0479 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-011-0636-4 |