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You don’t always get what you pay for: bonuses, perceived income and effort

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. This paper provides conditions such that no success bonus induces the agent to exert more effort and the optimal contract is independent of success. Moreover, success bonuses may even reduce e...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schnedler, Wendelin (Author)
Format: Article (Journal)
Language:English
Published: 2011
In: German economic review
Year: 2011, Volume: 12, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-10
ISSN:1468-0475
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0475.2010.00508.x
Online Access:Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2010.00508.x
Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2010.00508.x/html
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Author Notes:Wendelin Schnedler

MARC

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