Falsifikationismus ohne Festsetzungen

The aim of this essay is to show that the key innovations of Karl Popper's philosophy of science can be disentangled from the prevailing conventionalism in his main work "The Logic of Scientific Discovery." Popper's falsificationism and his rejection of justification can be detac...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Dierig, Simon (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Article (Journal)
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: [June 2021]
In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung
Year: 2021, Jahrgang: 75, Heft: 2, Pages: 187-201
ISSN:1439-2615
DOI:10.3196/004433021832831602
Online-Zugang:Verlag, Volltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433021832831602
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Simon Dierig
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The aim of this essay is to show that the key innovations of Karl Popper's philosophy of science can be disentangled from the prevailing conventionalism in his main work "The Logic of Scientific Discovery." Popper's falsificationism and his rejection of justification can be detached - from his view that the criterion of demarcation, the basic statements ("Basissätze") and the claim that laws are falsifiable hypotheses are stipulations.
Beschreibung:Gesehen am 23.11.2022
Beschreibung:Online Resource
ISSN:1439-2615
DOI:10.3196/004433021832831602