Falsifikationismus ohne Festsetzungen
The aim of this essay is to show that the key innovations of Karl Popper's philosophy of science can be disentangled from the prevailing conventionalism in his main work "The Logic of Scientific Discovery." Popper's falsificationism and his rejection of justification can be detac...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[June 2021]
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| In: |
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung
Year: 2021, Volume: 75, Issue: 2, Pages: 187-201 |
| ISSN: | 1439-2615 |
| DOI: | 10.3196/004433021832831602 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, Volltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433021832831602
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| Author Notes: | Simon Dierig |
| Summary: | The aim of this essay is to show that the key innovations of Karl Popper's philosophy of science can be disentangled from the prevailing conventionalism in his main work "The Logic of Scientific Discovery." Popper's falsificationism and his rejection of justification can be detached - from his view that the criterion of demarcation, the basic statements ("Basissätze") and the claim that laws are falsifiable hypotheses are stipulations. |
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| Item Description: | Gesehen am 23.11.2022 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1439-2615 |
| DOI: | 10.3196/004433021832831602 |