Closure and the lottery
Abstract Ever since Fred Dretske (1970) questioned closure, a denial of this principle has been among the standard options for a resolution of epistemological paradoxes such as the skeptical paradox (Cohen 1988) and the lottery paradox (Harman 1973). In this article, the author shall argue that all...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
04 Nov 2022
|
| In: |
Grazer philosophische Studien
Year: 2022, Pages: 1-15 |
| ISSN: | 1875-6735 |
| DOI: | 10.1163/18756735-00000170 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000170 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://brill.com/view/journals/gps/aop/article-10.1163-18756735-00000170/article-10.1163-18756735-00000170.xml 
|
| Author Notes: | Simon Dierig (University of Heidelberg) |
| Summary: | Abstract Ever since Fred Dretske (1970) questioned closure, a denial of this principle has been among the standard options for a resolution of epistemological paradoxes such as the skeptical paradox (Cohen 1988) and the lottery paradox (Harman 1973). In this article, the author shall argue that all possible solutions of the latter paradox can only be defended if Multi-Premise Closure is rejected. These possible solutions are contextualism and both simple and sensitive moderate invariantism. It will be shown that skepticism and the denial of Single-Premise Closure are not possible solutions of the lottery paradox. The upshot of the discussion here will be that while Single-Premise Closure is beyond reasonable doubt, resolving the lottery paradox forces one to abandon Multi-Premise Closure. |
|---|---|
| Item Description: | Gesehen am 23.11.2022 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1875-6735 |
| DOI: | 10.1163/18756735-00000170 |