Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems
We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[S.l.]
SSRN
2004
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| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.243518 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, kostenfrei: https://ssrn.com/abstract=243518 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.243518 
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| Author Notes: | Hans Gersbach, Verena Liessem |
| Summary: | We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency, although the incentive contracts need to be based on the same information available to the voters at reelection date |
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| Item Description: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 2003 erstellt |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.243518 |
| Access: | Open Access |