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Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems

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We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Gersbach, Hans (Author) , Liessem, Verena (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: [S.l.] SSRN 2004
DOI:10.2139/ssrn.243518
Online Access:Verlag, kostenfrei: https://ssrn.com/abstract=243518
Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.243518
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Author Notes:Hans Gersbach, Verena Liessem
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Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems by Gersbach, Hans (Author) , Liessem, Verena (Author) ,


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Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems by Gersbach, Hans (Author) , Liessem, Verena (Author) ,


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Book/Monograph Working Paper

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