Dissolving an ambiguous partnership
Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Heidelberg
Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
22 Sep. 2023
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| Series: | AWI discussion paper series
no. 733 (September 2023) |
| In: |
AWI discussion paper series (no. 733 (September 2023))
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| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00033829 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-338294 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://dx.doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00033829 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/33829 Verlag, kostenfrei: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/33829/7/Oechssler_Roomets_2023_dp733.pdf Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-338294 Langzeitarchivierung Nationalbibliothek, kostenfrei: https://d-nb.info/1303669188/34 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283379 
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| Author Notes: | Jörg Oechssler, Alex Roomets |
| Summary: | Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and a K + 1 auction. We find that the K +1 auction is the most e¢ cient mechanism, which is in line with theory. Free format bargaining yields a surprising number of disagreements, which are not usually observed when the partnership has a certain or risky value. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00033829 |