How to organize monitoring and munishment: experimental evidence
Punishment institutions for curtailing free-riding in social dilemmas rely on information about individuals’ behavior collected through monitoring. We contribute to the experimental study of cooperation-enhancing institutions by examining how cooperation and efficiency in a social dilemma change in...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Heidelberg
Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
September 20, 2023
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| Series: | AWI discussion paper series
no. 737 (September 2023) |
| In: |
AWI discussion paper series (no. 737 (September 2023))
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| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00033832 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-338326 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00033832 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/33832 Verlag, kostenfrei: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/33832/7/Goeschl_et_al_2023_dp737.pdf Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283382 
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| Author Notes: | Timo Goeschl, Beatrix Haberl, Alice Soldà |
| Summary: | Punishment institutions for curtailing free-riding in social dilemmas rely on information about individuals’ behavior collected through monitoring. We contribute to the experimental study of cooperation-enhancing institutions by examining how cooperation and efficiency in a social dilemma change in response to varying how monitoring and punishment are jointly organized. Specifically, we evaluate - against a no-monitoring baseline - combinations of two imperfect monitoring regimes (cen-tralized vs. decentralized) and three punishment regimes (self- vs. peer- vs. del-egated punishment) in a repeated public goods game. As hypothesized, we find that delegated punishment outperforms other punishment regimes, irrespective of the monitoring regime, both in terms of cooperation and efficiency. Monitoring, both centralized and decentralized, cannot raise cooperation relative to the baseline unless accompanied by a credible punishment. When combined with a punishment institution, both monitoring regime outperforms the baseline. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00033832 |