Commitment and conflict in unanimity bargaining
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum sh...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Heidelberg
Heidelberg University, Department of Economics
25 Jun. 2024
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| Series: | AWI discussion paper series
no. 749 (June 2024) |
| In: |
AWI discussion paper series (no. 749 (June 2024))
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| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00034994 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, kostenfrei: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/34994/7/Miettinen_Vanberg_dp749_2024.pdf Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-349948 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00034994 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/301189 
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| Author Notes: | Topi Miettinen, Christoph Vanberg |
| Summary: | We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00034994 |