Strategic thinking in the shadow of self-enhancement: Benefits and costs

Using a variant of the hide-and-seek game, we show in three studies that self-enhancement can help or hinder strategic thinking. In this guessing game, one player chooses a number while another player tries to guess it. Each player does this either in a random fashion (throwing a mental die) or by a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Grüning, David (Author) , Krueger, Joachim I. (Author)
Format: Article (Journal)
Language:English
Published: 2024
Edition:Early view
In: The British journal of social psychology
Year: 2024, Pages: 1-18
ISSN:2044-8309
DOI:10.1111/bjso.12747
Online Access:Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12747
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/bjso.12747
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Author Notes:David J. Grüning, Joachim I. Krueger
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Summary:Using a variant of the hide-and-seek game, we show in three studies that self-enhancement can help or hinder strategic thinking. In this guessing game, one player chooses a number while another player tries to guess it. Each player does this either in a random fashion (throwing a mental die) or by active thinking. The structure of the game implies that guessers benefit from thinking about a number, whereas choosers are disadvantaged. Yet, regardless of their role, respondents prefer to actively think about a number. For choosers, the belief they can outthink the opponent amounts to self-enhancement, whereas for guessers, the same belief can be rationally justified. We discuss the implications of the findings for theories of strategic cognition and applications to real-world contexts.
Item Description:Gesehen am 09.09.2024
Physical Description:Online Resource
ISSN:2044-8309
DOI:10.1111/bjso.12747