Strategic thinking in the shadow of self-enhancement: Benefits and costs
Using a variant of the hide-and-seek game, we show in three studies that self-enhancement can help or hinder strategic thinking. In this guessing game, one player chooses a number while another player tries to guess it. Each player does this either in a random fashion (throwing a mental die) or by a...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Article (Journal) |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| Ausgabe: | Early view |
| In: |
The British journal of social psychology
Year: 2024, Pages: 1-18 |
| ISSN: | 2044-8309 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/bjso.12747 |
| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12747 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/bjso.12747 
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| Verfasserangaben: | David J. Grüning, Joachim I. Krueger |
| Zusammenfassung: | Using a variant of the hide-and-seek game, we show in three studies that self-enhancement can help or hinder strategic thinking. In this guessing game, one player chooses a number while another player tries to guess it. Each player does this either in a random fashion (throwing a mental die) or by active thinking. The structure of the game implies that guessers benefit from thinking about a number, whereas choosers are disadvantaged. Yet, regardless of their role, respondents prefer to actively think about a number. For choosers, the belief they can outthink the opponent amounts to self-enhancement, whereas for guessers, the same belief can be rationally justified. We discuss the implications of the findings for theories of strategic cognition and applications to real-world contexts. |
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| Beschreibung: | Gesehen am 09.09.2024 |
| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 2044-8309 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/bjso.12747 |