Disentangling reputation from selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries: a field experiment
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such mechanis...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
April 30 2024
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| Edition: | Online early |
| In: |
The review of economics and statistics
Year: 2024, Pages: 1-26 |
| ISSN: | 1530-9142 |
| DOI: | 10.1162/rest_a_01451 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01451 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/doi/10.1162/rest_a_01451/120880/Disentangling-Reputation-from-Selection-Effects-in 
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| Author Notes: | Theodore Alysandratos, Sotiris Georganas and Matthias Sutter |
| Summary: | In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such mechanisms or because of reputational concerns of sellers. We show in a field experiment how to disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we find strong evidence for reputation effects, but little support for self-selection effects. We discuss policy implications of our findings. |
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| Item Description: | Gesehen am 19.11.2024 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1530-9142 |
| DOI: | 10.1162/rest_a_01451 |