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Disentangling reputation from selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries: a field experiment

In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such mechanis...

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Main Authors: Alysandratos, Theodore (Author) , Geōrganas, Sōtērēs (Author) , Sutter, Matthias (Author)
Format: Article (Journal)
Language:English
Published: April 30 2024
Edition:Online early
In: The review of economics and statistics
Year: 2024, Pages: 1-26
ISSN:1530-9142
DOI:10.1162/rest_a_01451
Online Access:Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01451
Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/doi/10.1162/rest_a_01451/120880/Disentangling-Reputation-from-Selection-Effects-in
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Author Notes:Theodore Alysandratos, Sotiris Georganas and Matthias Sutter

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