Information efficiency and majority decisions
The analysis is concerned with the characterization of equilibria of a two-stage voting game involving private information acquisition. Rational ignorance and information efficiency are identified. It turns out that information efficiency is not always desirable. By restricting the payoff domain, we...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
1995
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| In: |
Social choice and welfare
Year: 1995, Volume: 12, Issue: 4, Pages: 363-370 |
| ISSN: | 1432-217X |
| DOI: | 10.1007/BF00186280 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00186280
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| Author Notes: | Hans Gersbach |
| Summary: | The analysis is concerned with the characterization of equilibria of a two-stage voting game involving private information acquisition. Rational ignorance and information efficiency are identified. It turns out that information efficiency is not always desirable. By restricting the payoff domain, we are able to characterize completely the set of equilibria. In this case, information acquisition by few voters benefits a majority, or even the whole community. Economic Literature Classification Number D70, D71, D80. |
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| Item Description: | Gesehen am 11.12.2024 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1432-217X |
| DOI: | 10.1007/BF00186280 |