Trading off autonomy and efficiency in choice architectures: self-nudging versus social nudging
To overcome ethical objections to choice architecture interventions, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest asking individuals to set their own nudge autonomously. Our online experiment (n=1080) faithfully implements this idea for social dilemmas where individual and collective interests often diverge a...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization
Year: 2025, Volume: 229, Pages: 1-18 |
| ISSN: | 1879-1751 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106859 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124004736/pdfft?md5=519df2fd641ef9769a49427e141a44cb&pid=1-s2.0-S0167268124004736-main.pdf Resolving-System, lizenzpflichtig: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106859 Resolving-System, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106859 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124004736?via%3Dihub 
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| Author Notes: | Johannes Diederich, Timo Goeschl, Israel Waichman |
| Summary: | To overcome ethical objections to choice architecture interventions, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest asking individuals to set their own nudge autonomously. Our online experiment (n=1080) faithfully implements this idea for social dilemmas where individual and collective interests often diverge and social nudges can conflict with autonomy. General-population subjects play a ten-round, ten-day public goods game. Non-participation triggers default contributions. We test three default nudges: An exogenous selfish nudge of zero contribution, an exogenous social nudge of full contribution, and an autonomous self-nudge where subjects select their own default contribution. Their performance is tested under four different information structures. We, first, document default choice under autonomy: Only between three and eight percent of subjects set their own default to either zero or full contribution. Second, autonomy and efficiency conflict: Group-level contributions under self-nudging are consistently lower than under the social nudge, which strictly dominates the selfish nudge. When committed to autonomy, the policy-maker - to maximize efficiency - best combines self-nudging with an information structure with public defaults. |
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| Item Description: | Gesehen am 12.03.2025 Online veröffentlicht: 21. Dezember 2024 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1879-1751 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106859 |