Worldly reasons: an ontological inquiry into motivating considerations and normative reasons
In this article I advocate a worldly account of normative reasons according to which there is an ontological gap between these and the premises of practical thought, i.e. motivating considerations. While motivating considerations are individuated fine-grainedly, normative reasons should be classifie...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
December 2017
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| In: |
Pacific philosophical quarterly
Year: 2017, Volume: 98, Pages: 5-28 |
| ISSN: | 1468-0114 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/papq.12094 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12094 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/papq.12094 
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| Author Notes: | Susanne Mantel |
| Summary: | In this article I advocate a worldly account of normative reasons according to which there is an ontological gap between these and the premises of practical thought, i.e. motivating considerations. While motivating considerations are individuated fine-grainedly, normative reasons should be classified as coarse-grained entities, e.g. as states of affairs, in order to explain certain necessary truths about them and to make sense of how we count and weigh them. As I briefly sketch, acting for normative reasons is nonetheless possible if the connection between normative reasons and motivating considerations is a competence-based correspondence. |
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| Item Description: | Online veröffentlicht: 3. August 2015 Gesehen am 23.12.2025 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1468-0114 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/papq.12094 |