No reason for identity: on the relation between motivating and normative reasons
This essay is concerned with the relation between motivating and normative reasons. According to a common and influential thesis, a normative reason is identical with a motivating reason when an agent acts for that normative reason. I will call this thesis the ‘Identity Thesis’. Many philosophers tr...
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2014
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| In: |
Philosophical explorations
Year: 2014, Volume: 17, Issue: 1, Pages: 49-62 |
| ISSN: | 1741-5918 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/13869795.2013.815261 |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2013.815261 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13869795.2013.815261 
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| Author Notes: | Susanne Mantel |
| Summary: | This essay is concerned with the relation between motivating and normative reasons. According to a common and influential thesis, a normative reason is identical with a motivating reason when an agent acts for that normative reason. I will call this thesis the ‘Identity Thesis’. Many philosophers treat the Identity Thesis as a commonplace or a truism. Accordingly, the Identity Thesis has been used to rule out certain ontological views about reasons. I distinguish a deliberative and an explanatory version of the Identity Thesis and argue that there are no convincing arguments to accept either version. Furthermore, I point out an alternative to the Identity Thesis. The relation between motivating and normative reasons can be thought of as one of representation, not identity. |
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| Item Description: | Online veröffentlicht: 26. Juli 2013 Gesehen am 23.12.2025 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1741-5918 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/13869795.2013.815261 |