Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge
I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2013
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| In: |
Synthese
Year: 2013, Volume: 190, Issue: 17, Pages: 3865-3888 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-012-0230-8 |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0230-8 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-012-0230-8 
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| Author Notes: | Susanne Mantel |
| Summary: | I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means that acting for a normative reason is in many respects similar to knowledge. In order to strengthen Sosa’s account of knowledge, I propose to supplement it with an appeal to sub-competences. This clarifies how this account can deal with certain Gettier cases, and it helps to understand how exactly acting for a normative reason is similar to apt belief. |
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| Item Description: | Online veröffentlicht: 9. Dezember 2012 Gesehen am 23.12.2025 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-012-0230-8 |