Compensation and moral luck
In some vicarious cases of compensation, an agent seems obligated to compensate for a harm they did not inflict. This raises the problem that obligations for compensation may arise out of circumstantial luck. That is, an agent may owe compensation for a harm that was outside their control. Addressin...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
April 2021
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| In: |
The monist
Year: 2021, Volume: 104, Issue: 2, Pages: 251-264 |
| ISSN: | 2153-3601 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/monist/onaa036 |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa036 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://academic.oup.com/monist/article-abstract/104/2/251/6170646?redirectedFrom=fulltext 
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| Author Notes: | Nora Heinzelmann |
| Summary: | In some vicarious cases of compensation, an agent seems obligated to compensate for a harm they did not inflict. This raises the problem that obligations for compensation may arise out of circumstantial luck. That is, an agent may owe compensation for a harm that was outside their control. Addressing this issue, I identify five conditions for compensation from the literature: causal engagement, proxy, ill-gotten gains, constitution, and affiliation. I argue that only two of them specify genuine and irreducible grounds for compensation, and that factors determining the agent’s obligations may be beyond their control. However, I suggest that this is unproblematic. There is thus no problem of circumstantial moral luck for compensation. |
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| Item Description: | Online veröffentlicht: 11. März 2021 Gesehen am 04.02.2026 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 2153-3601 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/monist/onaa036 |