The normative property dualism argument

In this paper, I develop an argument against a type of Non-Analytic Normative Naturalism. This argument, the Normative Property Dualism Argument, suggests that if Non-Analytic Normative Naturalists posit that normative properties are identical to natural properties and that such identities are a pos...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hambly, Jesse (Author)
Format: Article (Journal)
Language:English
Published: April 2025
In: The philosophical quarterly
Year: 2025, Volume: 75, Issue: 2, Pages: 517-538
ISSN:1467-9213
DOI:10.1093/pq/pqae028
Online Access:Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae028
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Author Notes:Jesse Hambly
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Summary:In this paper, I develop an argument against a type of Non-Analytic Normative Naturalism. This argument, the Normative Property Dualism Argument, suggests that if Non-Analytic Normative Naturalists posit that normative properties are identical to natural properties and that such identities are a posteriori, they will be forced to posit that these properties that are both normative and natural have higher-order normative properties of their own.
Item Description:Online veröffentlicht: 24. April 2024
Gesehen am 09.02.2026
Physical Description:Online Resource
ISSN:1467-9213
DOI:10.1093/pq/pqae028