Practical deliberation is normative
It is common for philosophers to suggest that practical deliberation is normative; deliberation about what to do essentially involves employing normative concepts. This thesis—‘the Normativity Thesis’—is significant because, among other things, it supports the conclusion that normative thought is in...
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
09 January 2025
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| In: |
Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Year: 2025, Volume: 11, Issue: 2, Pages: 338-353 |
| ISSN: | 2053-4485 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/apa.2024.23 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2024.23 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/practical-deliberation-is-normative/60364D9879863A0505332A1757CB764B 
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| Author Notes: | Jesse Hambly |
| Summary: | It is common for philosophers to suggest that practical deliberation is normative; deliberation about what to do essentially involves employing normative concepts. This thesis—‘the Normativity Thesis’—is significant because, among other things, it supports the conclusion that normative thought is inescapable for us. In this article, I defend the Normativity Thesis against objections. |
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| Item Description: | Gesehen am 09.02.2026 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 2053-4485 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/apa.2024.23 |