Legislative bargaining with private information: a comparison of majority and unanimity rule
We investigate the effects of alternative voting rules in a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known disagreement payoffs. We characte...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
October 2025
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| In: |
Games and economic behavior
Year: 2025, Volume: 153, Pages: 499-522 |
| ISSN: | 1090-2473 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.010 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.010 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825625001034 
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| Author Notes: | David Piazolo, Christoph Vanberg |
| Summary: | We investigate the effects of alternative voting rules in a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known disagreement payoffs. We characterize Bayesian equilibria in stagewise undominated strategies. Our central result is that responders are ‘more expensive’ under unanimity rule because they like to be perceived as high types. Inefficient delay and disagreement are more likely under unanimity rule, except under very restrictive parameter conditions. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for intuitions that have been stated informally before. In addition, it yields deeper insights into the underlying incentives and what they imply for optimal behavior in bargaining with private information. |
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| Item Description: | Online verfügbar 11 August 2025, Version des Artikels 19 August 2025 Gesehen am 18.03.2026 We thank the editor and three anonymous referees for exceptionally constructive comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Hülya Eraslan, Attila Ambrus, and seminar audiences at Heidelberg, Bayreuth, Duke, and the 2022 Meeting of the European Public Choice Society. Financial support from the German Science Foundation (DFG grant 314978473) is gratefully acknowledged |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1090-2473 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.010 |