Sophistry and apparent wisdom in Aristotle
Scholars often suppose that those who employ sophistical refutations seek argumentative victory alone. By surveying Aristotle’s testimonies about this argumentative practice, I argue that, in Aristotle’s strict sense of the term, sophistry involves using refutations in order to support certain contr...
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Article (Journal) |
| Lingua: | inglese |
| Pubblicazione: |
Fall 2025
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| In: |
Ancient philosophy
Year: 2025, Volume: 45, Fascicolo: 2, Pages: 437-458 |
| ISSN: | 2154-4689 |
| DOI: | 10.5840/ancientphil202545227 |
| Accesso online: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202545227 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=ancientphil&id=ancientphil_2025_0045_0002_0437_0458 
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| Note sull'autore: | Ian J. Campbell |
| Riassunto: | Scholars often suppose that those who employ sophistical refutations seek argumentative victory alone. By surveying Aristotle’s testimonies about this argumentative practice, I argue that, in Aristotle’s strict sense of the term, sophistry involves using refutations in order to support certain controversial doctrines, thereby gaining a reputation for wisdom. In particular, sophists support these doctrines by presenting them as the solutions to the contradictions and paradoxes in which they ensnare their interlocutors. |
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| Descrizione del documento: | Gesehen am 06.05.2026 |
| Descrizione fisica: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 2154-4689 |
| DOI: | 10.5840/ancientphil202545227 |