Adequacy as an epistemically just social practice in Spinoza's philosophy
Spinoza is usually understood to be internalist about the representation of adequate ideas and externalist about the representation of inadequate ideas. Existing readings of Spinoza's social epistemology do not challenge this view; they argue that the social context of the mind is an empowering...
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Article (Journal) |
| Lingua: | inglese |
| Pubblicazione: |
4. August 2025
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| In: |
The Southern journal of philosophy
Year: 2025, Volume: 63, Fascicolo: 2, Pages: 174-191 |
| ISSN: | 2041-6962 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/sjp.12618 |
| Accesso online: | Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12618 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/sjp.12618 
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| Note sull'autore: | Oliver Toth |
| Riassunto: | Spinoza is usually understood to be internalist about the representation of adequate ideas and externalist about the representation of inadequate ideas. Existing readings of Spinoza's social epistemology do not challenge this view; they argue that the social context of the mind is an empowering enabling condition for acquiring knowledge. In this article, I argue that Spinoza is an externalist about the representation of both adequate and inadequate ideas: adequate ideas are constituted by the relation between the mind's real essence and real objects. Since the mind's essence is desire, the mind knows its own real essence if it desires its real effects, that is, what follows from the common order of nature. Having an adequate idea is a social practice in two senses. It presupposes taking into account the striving of every other being and to desire only what is compatible with those beings (in this sense, it is also epistemically just). It also amounts to participating in the most collective action that can be joined by every other being, that is, in bringing about the world that can be shared by every being. |
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| Descrizione del documento: | Gesehen am 21.05.2026 |
| Descrizione fisica: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 2041-6962 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/sjp.12618 |