Die Entstehung von Spinozas Urteilstheorie und ihre Implikationen für seine politische Philosophie

In this paper, we reconstruct the development of Spinoza’s theory of judgment against the backdrop of the development of his political views. In this context we also look at the difference between Descartes’ meta-act theory of judgment, which Spinoza criticises, and his own all-inclusive approach. B...

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Auteurs principaux: Toth, Oliver Istvan (Auteur) , Renz, Ursula (Auteur)
Format: Article (Journal)
Langue:anglais
Publié: 18. September 2021
In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
Year: 2021, Volume: 69, Numéro: 4, Pages: 633-645
ISSN:2192-1482
DOI:10.1515/dzph-2021-0053
Accès en ligne:Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2021-0053
Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/dzph-2021-0053/html?lang=de
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Notes sur l'auteur:Oliver Istvan Toth, Ursula Renz
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Résumé:In this paper, we reconstruct the development of Spinoza’s theory of judgment against the backdrop of the development of his political views. In this context we also look at the difference between Descartes’ meta-act theory of judgment, which Spinoza criticises, and his own all-inclusive approach. By “meta-act theory” we understand the claim that content and judgment about the truth of the content are metaphysically really distinct mental items. By an “all-inclusive theory” we understand the claim that judgment and content constitute only one mental act. We show further how the core intuitions of this all-inclusive theory are developed by Spinoza in an increasingly radical manner and how the practical implications of his all-inclusive theory come to the fore in the Theological-Political Treatise : given that content and act are not really distinct, it is metaphysically impossible that human subjects can give up their ability to judge, which is why Spinoza can plausibly contend that everybody has an inalienable right to form their own judgment.
Description:Gesehen am 01.06.2026
Description matérielle:Online Resource
ISSN:2192-1482
DOI:10.1515/dzph-2021-0053