Personal identity
Although the problem is perhaps as old as philosophy itself, the concept of ‘personal identity’ is introduced into philosophical discourse by John Locke (1632-1704) in his Essay concerning Human Understanding. For Locke, the issue became pressing because of his agnostic attitude with respect to the...
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Chapter/Article |
| Lingua: | inglese |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| In: |
The Cambridge Spinoza lexicon
Year: 2024, Pages: 419-421 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/9781108992459.145 |
| Accesso online: | Resolving-System, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108992459.145 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-spinoza-lexicon/personal-identity/F4E597038553F179ABC644565618432E 
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| Note sull'autore: | Ursula Renz and Oliver I. Toth |
| Riassunto: | Although the problem is perhaps as old as philosophy itself, the concept of ‘personal identity’ is introduced into philosophical discourse by John Locke (1632-1704) in his Essay concerning Human Understanding. For Locke, the issue became pressing because of his agnostic attitude with respect to the existence and essence of substances and therefore with respect to the notion that human persons are, or consist of, substances. It is against this skeptical background that the question as to what constitutes the identity of persons needs to be addressed in Locke, and he does so by turning consciousness and memory into the grounding for, and the criterion of, personal identity. |
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| Descrizione del documento: | Elektronische Reproduktion der Druck-Ausgabe Online publiziert: 9. Januar 2025 Gesehen am 01.06.2026 |
| Descrizione fisica: | Online Resource |
| ISBN: | 9781108992459 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/9781108992459.145 |