Epistemic value as attributive goodness?
According to insulationism, a common take on epistemic value, being of epistemic value does not entail being of value simpliciter. In this paper, I explore one version of insulationism which has so far received little attention in the literature. On this view, epistemic value does not entail value s...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Article (Journal) |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| In: |
Episteme
Year: 2025, Volumen: 22, Número: 2, Pages: 439-454 |
| ISSN: | 1750-0117 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/epi.2023.63 |
| Acceso en línea: | Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.63 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/epistemic-value-as-attributive-goodness/892B15054BF404A0ED6877A3B2F8AA29 
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| Notas de Autor: | Michael Vollmer |
| Sumario: | According to insulationism, a common take on epistemic value, being of epistemic value does not entail being of value simpliciter. In this paper, I explore one version of insulationism which has so far received little attention in the literature. On this view, epistemic value does not entail value simpliciter because it is a form of attributive goodness, that is, being good as a member of a particular kind. While having a significant advantage over some other formulations of insulationism, I argue that the attributive goodness view of epistemic value should be rejected. On the one hand, shifting to a discussion of attributive goodness comes with several contentious commitments, as well as implausible upshots for epistemic axiology. On the other hand, I demonstrate that one can strengthen other forms of insulationism in such a way that the supposed advantage of the attributive goodness view diminishes. |
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| Notas: | Online veröffentlicht: 11. Januar 2024 Gesehen am 23.07.2026 |
| Descripción Física: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1750-0117 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/epi.2023.63 |