Émilie Du Châtelet's account of knowledge
This paper identifies two levels of knowledge in Du Châtelet, wherein the two axiomatic principles of knowledge, the PSR and the PC, play an entirely different role. On the first level, they give rise to certainty, on the second to probability. The two levels explain how two differing claims in the...
Enregistré dans:
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Langue: | anglais |
| Publié: |
July 2025
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| In: |
History of philosophy quarterly
Year: 2025, Volume: 42, Numéro: 3, Pages: 267-286 |
| ISSN: | 2152-1026 |
| DOI: | 10.5406/21521026.42.3.04 |
| Accès en ligne: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.42.3.04
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| Notes sur l'auteur: | Clara Carus |
| Résumé: | This paper identifies two levels of knowledge in Du Châtelet, wherein the two axiomatic principles of knowledge, the PSR and the PC, play an entirely different role. On the first level, they give rise to certainty, on the second to probability. The two levels explain how two differing claims in the literature on Du Châtelet's account of knowledge, which seem to be in tension with each other, can both be correct. |
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| Description: | Gesehen am 23.07.2026 |
| Description matérielle: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 2152-1026 |
| DOI: | 10.5406/21521026.42.3.04 |