Aesthetic judgments, evaluative content, and (hybrid) expressivism
Abstract: Aesthetic statements of the form ‘X is beautiful’ are evaluative; they indicate the speaker’s positive affective attitude regarding X. Why is this so? Is the evaluative content part of the truth conditions, or is it a pragmatic phenomenon (i.e. presupposition, implicature)? First, I argue...
Enregistré dans:
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Langue: | anglais |
| Publié: |
2024
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| In: |
Ergo
Year: 2024, Volume: 11, Pages: 489-515 |
| ISSN: | 2330-4014 |
| DOI: | 10.3998/ergo.6159 |
| Accès en ligne: | Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.6159 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/6159/ 
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| Notes sur l'auteur: | Jochen Briesen, University of Konstanz |
| Résumé: | Abstract: Aesthetic statements of the form ‘X is beautiful’ are evaluative; they indicate the speaker’s positive affective attitude regarding X. Why is this so? Is the evaluative content part of the truth conditions, or is it a pragmatic phenomenon (i.e. presupposition, implicature)? First, I argue that semantic approaches as well as these pragmatic ones cannot satisfactorily explain the evaluativity of aesthetic statements. Second, I offer a positive proposal based on a speech-act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, which states that, with the literal utterance of ‘X is beautiful’, we perform two illocutionary acts simultaneously, an assertive and an expressive one. I will specify this theory in detail and argue that it can satisfactorily account for the evaluative content of aesthetic statements. I will also discuss the advantages of the theory over other variants of expressivism in meta-aesthetics. Aesthetic statements of the form ‘X is beautiful’ are evaluative; they indicate the speaker’s positive affective attitude regarding X. Why is this so? Is the evaluative content part of the truth conditions, or is it a pragmatic phenomenon (i.e. presupposition, implicature)? First, I argue that semantic approaches as well as these pragmatic ones cannot satisfactorily explain the evaluativity of aesthetic statements. Second, I offer a positive proposal based on a speech-act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, which states that, with the literal utterance of ‘X is beautiful’, we perform two illocutionary acts simultaneously, an assertive and an expressive one. I will specify this theory in detail and argue that it can satisfactorily account for the evaluative content of aesthetic statements. I will also discuss the advantages of the theory over other variants of expressivism in meta-aesthetics. |
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| Description matérielle: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 2330-4014 |
| DOI: | 10.3998/ergo.6159 |