Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption
We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of...
Guardado en:
| Otros Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
München
CESifo
Apr. 2005
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| Colección: | CESifo working paper Empirical and theoretical methods
1448 |
| In: |
CESifo working papers (1448)
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Download aus dem Internet, Stand 03.05.2005, Volltext: http://opus.zbw-kiel.de/volltexte/2005/3075/pdf/cesifo1_wp1448.pdf Verlag, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/~DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1448.pdf 
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| Notas de Autor: | Hans Gersbach |
| Sumario: | We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same. |
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| Descripción Física: | Online Resource |
| Formato: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader. |