Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption
We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.]
2005
|
| Series: | CESifo working paper series Empirical and theoretical methods
1448 |
| In: |
CESifo working papers (1448)
|
| Online Access: |
|
| Author Notes: | Hans Gersbach; Hans Haller |
| Summary: | We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same. |
|---|